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Remedies
By KENNETH B. GERMAIN*
I. MISTAKE AS A DEFENSE TO PERSONAL INJURY RELEASES
A. Introduction
In Trevathan v. Tesseneer,' the plaintiff, Melissa Treva-
than, was knocked unconscious in an automobile accident
while riding as a passenger in a car owned by one defendant
and driven by the other defendant. She was hospitalized for
several days and then returned to her home where her doctor
further examined her for internal injuries and inspected an
abrasion on her elbow. According to the complaint, the plain-
tiff also informed her doctor of a lump on the side of her head.
Two weeks after the accident an insurance adjuster inter-
viewed the plaintiff and took her statement regarding the acci-
dent and her injuries and expenses. About two months after the
accident,2 Trevathan, a 21-year old college senior acting "with
full knowledge of her parents,"'3 believing that she had recuper-
ated from all of the injuries caused by the accident, signed a
standard form release in return for the insurance company's
payment of $344.16. By the terms of the release, she released
the defendants and their insurer from "all injuries, known or
unknown. . . which have resulted or may in the future develop
." from the accident.
4
Two months after signing the release, and thus about four
months after the accident, the plaintiff suffered a blackout;
medical examinations indicated that she had a type of epilepsy
caused by a traumatic head injury. The condition appeared to
be serious and permanent, causing "considerable physical im-
pairment and financial expense.'' 5
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, both of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Rutgers Univer-
sity; J.D. 1969, New York University School of Law. The author wishes to thank his
research assistant, Mr. F. Craig La Rocca, for his valuable assistance.
519 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1975).
2 The opinion does not indicate the exact date of the accident.
519 S.W.2d at 614.
Id. at 615.
Id.
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whom pleaded the release in defense. The plaintiff challenged
the validity of the release, arguing that it should be set aside
because of "mistake." The circuit court, however, upheld the
validity of the release and granted the defendants summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's
judgment in an opinion written by Special Commissioner Ar-
mand Angelucci, who stated the issue very clearly:
The sole issue for the court's consideration here is the effect
of the release signed by the appellant. Since the record is
devoid of any indication of fraud, overreaching, or physical
impairment at the time of execution, the simple question
becomes whether the release is final and binding according
to its terms or whether it may be invalidated on the ground
of mutual mistake as to the nature and extent of [plaintiff's]
injuries.'
In enforcing the release the Court relied primarily on a
prior Kentucky case, Clark v. Brewer.7 In Clark, the plaintiff,
who had only a tenth-grade education, had incorrectly "as-
sumed" that the release he had signed by endorsing a settle-
ment check for $104.88 covered only property damages and not
personal injuries.' However, the release stated very clearly that
it covered all "known and unknown .. .[injuries to] person
and property."9 When he later discovered serious personal inju-
ries resulting from the accident, his lawsuit was undercut by
the release. The Court of Appeals, affirming the circuit court's
decision against the plaintiff, stated:
When an instrument is clearly within the understanding of
the parties, one who for a valuable consideration signs with-
out reading and without inducement either to sign or not to
read, cannot shelter under a claim of mistake. He is not truly
mistaken in the content. He has simply made no effort to
ascertain it.1'
aId.
7 329 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1959).
The plaintiff's property damage totaled $104.88.
' 329 S.W.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 386, citing Kentucky Rd. Oiling Co. v. Sharp, 78 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Ky. 1934),
to the effect that even illiterates will be bound by what they sign, since they should
know enough to have someone read it to them.
[Vol. 64
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The Trevathan Court quoted the first sentence of this passage"
and made a passing reference to Gibson v. Dupin,'2 an earlier
case that had approved the teaching of Clark. In Gibson the
Court upheld a "release"' 3 obtained in order to satisfy the Fin-
ancial Responsibility Law, 4 even though the release was appar-
ently given gratuitously and the plaintiff mistakenly failed to
realize that he might have a cause of action against the minor
driver's father, who owned the vehicle involved.
The Trevathan Court also relied on Johns v. Kubaugh,"1
in which the plaintiff had received $32.60 in consideration for
signing a release that included the bold-faced caveat: "THIS
IS A FULL RELEASE-READ CAREFULLY." Although the
automobile accident had been a very minor one, apparently
causing only some "low back pain," it allegedly led to two
hospital stays for severe back problems and possible heart
damage. The plaintiff claimed that the insurance adjuster had
orally represented that the release did not cover personal inju-
ries. Nevertheless, both the trial court and the Court of Ap-
peals held for the defendant.'"
The Trevathan opinion is rounded out by a brief reference
to the policies behind the Court's strict enforcement of releases.
The Court pointed to the "many years"' 7 of adherence to the
Clark rule and concluded that the "rule favors orderly settle-
ment of disputes and avoids multiplicity of suits and the chaos
which would result if the releases were not treated seriously by
the courts."' 8 A small bone of sympathy was thrown to the
plaintiff at the end of the opinion."
1 519 S.W.2d at 615.
12 377 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1964).
11 "Though expressed in terms of a mere acknowledgement, the disclaimer at the
foot of the release form must be presumed to have a purpose more significant than its
possible use in evidence as an admission against interest." Id. at 586.
" See Ky. REV. STAT. § 187.340(4) (1971).
450 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1970).
" The Court said:
In [the] face of the clear language of the release considered with the fact
that [plaintiff] did not then regard herself as having any claim for personal
injury, it is difficult to perceive how she could rely on a purported statement
of an adjuster flatly contradicting the plainly stated terms of the release.
Id. at 262, quoted in Trevathan, 519 S.W.2d at 615.
11 519 S.W.2d at 615. This is somewhat of an overstatement, since Clark was
decided in 1959, only 16 years before Trevathan.
519 S.W.2d at 616.
" See the statement quoted from Amlung v. First Nat'l Bank, 411 S.W.2d 465,
19751
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B. Kentucky "Mistake" Law
Although Trevathan is consistent with the prior Kentucky
cases discussed above, it is probably not mandated by those
decisions. For example, it could be cogently argued that the
two cases heavily relied upon by the Court of Appeals involved
a type of mistake different from the mistake in Trevathan. In
Clark2" and Johns21 the plaintiffs misunderstood the legal effect
of signing their releases, whereas in Trevathan the plaintiff
failed to accurately appreciate the nature of her injury. Indeed,
the Trevathan opinion noted this distinction, but dismissed its
importance by saying that "there appears to be little difference
in the treatment of releases. 22 However, a valid distinction can
be made: In the earlier cases the mistakes could easily be
viewed as self-imposed, for in each case the plaintiff was to
some extent negligent in failing to carefully read the proffered
document before he signed it; in contrast, the plaintiff in
Trevathan appears to be faultless, having acted in reasonable
reliance upon the professional advice of her physician.23 Be-
cause the granting or denial of relief from mistake is often
treated as a matter of broad "equitable" discretion, it would
not be at all peculiar to draw a distinction along these lines.2
Another notable aspect of Kentucky "mistake" law rele-
vant to Trevathan is the arguable inconsistency between the
1954 case of Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Steiden Stores, Inc.2
468 (Ky. 1967), where the Court quoted the trial judge who had upheld the validity of
a release by analogy to the Clark case, but added that it did so "although I sympathize
with the plaintiff in her plight." 519 S.W.2d at 616.
2 Clark v. Brewer, 329 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1959), discussed in text accompanying
notes 7-10 supra.
21 Johns v. Kubaugh, 450 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1970), discussed in text accompanying
notes 15-16 supra.
22 519 S.W.2d at 615. It should also be noted that in Gibson v. Dupin, 377 S.W.2d
585 (Ky. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 12-14 supra, the mistake could
most appropriately be described as a "mistake of law," a type of mistake that courts
are generally unwilling to recognize as an invalidating cause. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 11.8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS ON REMEDIES].
Cf. Dobbs, Conclusiveness of Personal Injury Settlements: Basic Problems, 41
N.C.L. REv. 665, 729-30 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs, Basic Problems].
U See id. at 724: "Behind the facade of mutual mistake the courts are going about
the work of adjusting, the best they can, the 'equities' of the unfortunate situation.
Mutual mistake, at least in the technical sense, has little or nothing to do with their
decisions."
- 267 S.W.2d 733 (Ky. 1954).
[Vol. 64
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and the personal injury release cases. In Phoenix Indemnity a
property insurance policy differentiated between "inside jobs"
and other thefts, providing a lower maximum coverage for the
former type of loss. A theft occurred, resulting in a loss of
nearly twice the "inside job" policy limit of $2,500. After inves-
tigating and finding no evidence that the theft had been com-
mitted by any of the insured's employees, the insurance com-
pany paid the full loss. Over one and one-half years later, how-
ever, one of the insured's employees confessed his guilt, and the
insurance company sued for a refund of its "overpayment."
The Court of Appeals reversed a trial court judgment for the
insured, holding that the insurance company could recover its
excess payment made pursuant to a mistake of fact. In so hold-
ing, the Court expressly rejected cases treating this situation
as an unremediable "assumption of risk," explaining that such
cases made "a judicial determination that the insurer and the
recipient of the payment have entered into a compromise,
where no real compromise has been made."" The policy basis
for this decision was the encouragement of prompt settlements
by insurance companies, but the Court emphasized that the
insurance company's payment of the full amount of the
claimed loss indicated that no compromise (i.e., "assumption
of risk") was intended.
27
Quite aside from the merits vel non of the Phoenix
Indemnity case,2 the decision poses an interesting contrast
with Trevathan. Apparently, if an insurance company makes
a mistake and pays too much it may recover the excess, but if
a tort victim makes a mistake and receives too little he or she
may not recover the deficiency. Perhaps this analysis is overly
21 Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
27 Id.
2' For apt criticism see DOBBS ON REMEDIES § 11.7, at 758-59, where it is contended
that insurance companies should be viewed as "assuming the risk" of mistake, since
their policies always obligate them to pay claims within a specified period of time,
indicating that they must expect sometimes to have to pay without wholly satisfactory
evidence. Moreover, Dobbs further opines that after the policy's investigation period
has passed and the insured has been paid there are strong reasons to consider the case
closed, so as not to impair the security of the insured, who probably relies in a variety
of ways upon the finality of the settlement. Indeed, this analysis would seem especially
appropriate in a case like Phoenix Indemnity, where the time lapse between payment
and discovery of the mistake was over one and one-half years.
19751
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simplistic. Arguably, the mistake in Phoenix Indemnity was a
palpable mistake in performance of a contract and should
rightly lead to restitution of the "unjust enrichment,""3
whereas the mistake in Trevathan was merely a mistake as to
the formation of a contract and should be remediless-or was
it?1" What would the outcome be if the insurance company paid
too little in a Phoenix Indemnity-type situation? Would the
Court of Appeals order an additional payment? How would the
Court handle a Trevathan-type case in which the insurance
company paid too much? Would the Court refuse to grant re-
lief?3' It is interesting that the Kentucky Court seems to have
more sympathy for mistaken insurance companies than mis-
taken tort victims, when most jurisdictions see it the other way.
C. The Rule in Other Jurisdictions
[Outside of Kentucky] there appears to be a definite trend
* . .toward granting relief liberally where it appears that the
injured party will otherwise be left to suffer injuries, or the
results of injuries, unsuspected at the time of the execution
of the release, [particularly where] the financial burden...
will far exceed the compensation given in the release.
32
Clancy v. Pacenti,3  an Illinois Appellate Court case, is repre-
21 Indeed this was the basis given in Phoenix Indemnity, 267 S.W.2d at 734, where
the Court relied upon Supreme Council of Catholic Knights of America v. Fenwick,
183 S.W. 906, 910 (Ky. 1916):
It is the settled rule in this state, adopted at an early date and followed by
a long line of decisions, that whenever, by a clear or palpable mistake of law
or fact essentially bearing upon and affecting the contract, money has been
paid without consideration, which in law, honor, or conscience was not due
and payable, and which in honor or good conscience ought not to be retained,
it may and ought to be recovered.
Accord, McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 237 F. Supp. 874 (W.D.S.C. 1965); see DOBBS ON
REMEDIES § 11.7, at 755-56.
3 Cf. Dobbs, Basic Problems 712: "Sometimes courts introduce some related
complications by distinguishing among . . . kinds of mistakes . . . .But these un-
needed distinctions do not often seem to be determinative in the courts' thinking of
the problem of relief or no relief .... "
11 For an interesting dictum suggesting an affirmative answer in New Jersey, see
Reinhardt v. Wilbur, 105 A.2d 415, 416-17 (N.J. Super. 1954).
32 Andrews, The Personal Injury Release, 1965 INS. L.J. 212; cf. Note, 16 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 340, 350 (1969); DOBBS ON REMEDIES § 11.10, at 777 n.23: "It is fairly
common to allow relief where the settlement sum equals or approximately equals a
property damage claim and little or nothing is allowed for personal injury."
145 N.E.2d 802 (Ill. Ct. App. 1957).
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sentative of the "pro-relief" cases. The plaintiff in Clancy was
injured in an automobile accident, suffering a "sprained" back
according to the plaintiff's physician. Two and a half months
later the plaintiff signed a typical release in return for a pay-
ment of $150, $100 of which was allocated to property damage.
Eight months later he underwent surgery for herniated discs,
whereupon he sued for recovery of full damages, notwithstand-
ing the release. The court held the release voidable and allowed
a judgment for plaintiff in an amount exceeding $22,000, view-
ing the release payment of $150 as a mere "nominal" sum not
indicative of a bona fide compromise of the personal injury
claim. 4 It pointed out that there had been a mutual mistake
as to a serious unknown injury, because both parties had un-
derstood the plaintiff's injury to be "of little or no conse-
quence" and were wrong "both as to [the] nature and extent"
of the injury.35 It emphasized that this was not a case in
which the parties had settled on the "assumption that the con-
sequences [of a known injury] would not be as severe as those
which followed." 3 The court then strongly urged that personal
injury release cases be treated differently from commercial
mistake cases:
[P]ersonal injuries cases . .. are sui generis .... [N]o
rationale has been formulated for special treatment of such
cases. It appears to rest on the peculiar character of personal
injuries. In such cases it is not an article of commerce that is
involved, but the human mind and body, still the most com-
plicated and mysterious of all things that are upon or inhabit
the earth. Here, mistakes are easily made and the conse-
quences are more serious than in any other of the affairs of
man. A slight abrasion may mean nothing or it may lead to
a malignancy. Insignificant pain may mean the beginning of
a fatal coronary attack or only a slight intestinal disturbance.
Yet, a man cannot and does not live in dread of these possibil-
ities. He accepts assurances that all will be well, even though
ultimate consequences cannot be appraised as in matters in-
volving property or services.37
11 Id. at 805.
5 Id.
25 Id.
37Id.
19751
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The opinion was ended with a statement acknowledging the
"sharp economic inequality of the bargaining parties which
generally exists in this class of cases.""
A few other pro-relief cases are worth mentioning. In
Dansby v. Buck,3" a release obtained in return for a payment
of $138 (attributable to the plaintiff's property damages only)
was avoided in accordance with "sound logic" and the "great
weight of authority."4 More significantly, however, the court
stated that its task was to ascertain the actual intention of the
parties vis-a-vis assuming the risk of truly unknown injuries.
In this vein the court said that a release would be rescinded,
"if it is clearly established that [it] was entered into under a
mutual mistake as to a substantial injury, existing but un-
known at the time and not taken into consideration."" It even
added that "[i]t matters not that the releasor read and under-
stood the release.
' -42
An interesting contrast appears in Harvey v. Robey,
4 3
where a true compromise settlement, achieved after many
meetings between the parties and calling for payment of $524
for medical expenses plus $1,000 to cover possible future medi-
cal expenses, was upheld even though the plaintiff's "head
injuries" ultimately led to blindness in one eye and deafness in
one ear. The court explained that the plaintiff's ultimate inju-
ries were merely "the unknown and unexpected consequences
Cf. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 765-66, 768 n.44 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., concurring); Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336
(2d Cir. 1941).
31 373 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1962).
11 Id. at 4. Accord, Reed v. Harvey, 110 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1961); Denton v. Utley,
86 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1957).
" 373 P.2d at 4 (emphasis added). Accord, Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 467 P.2d 214, 218 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970):
The rule permitting a general, release to be set aside for mutual mistake of
fact as to the nature and extent of the injury has been liberally applied. It
has not been expanded in this state to include situations in which the parties
have been mistaken about future developments of the injury. The mistake
must relate to a past or present fact, material to the contract and not to an
opinion regarding future conditions as a result of present facts . . . . A
mistake as to the future consequences of a known injury is not a mistake of
fact.
373 P.2d at 4.
176 S.E.2d 673 (Va. 1970).
[Vol. 64
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of a known injury," 4 thereby following a well-established line
of authority refusing to grant relief under such circumstances."
Much more significantly, however, the court emphasized the
actual existence and effect of a compromise:
Mistakes as to matters which the contracting parties had in
mind as possibilities and as to the existence of which they
took the risk are not such mistakes of fact as to entitle either
party to relief . . .[quoting a previous case]: The parties
knew that the plaintiff would require future medical treat-
ment. . . .They bargained with respect to future bills in the
release . . .[quoting from another previous case]."
In addition to Harvey's enforcement of a true compromise, it
reaffirmed an earlier decision allowing rescission of a release
that was not the product of a true compromise.4"
Of course there is another side to the coin. Some courts
48
still take a very hard line against rescission of personal injury
releases, on the basis of policies favoring stability and security
in contractual undertakings. One law review commentator has
stated the argument in this way:
Avoidance of a release on the ground of mutual mistake of
fact seems, in some ways, to make a mockery of contractual
release of any-and-all-known-and-unknown injuries. The in-
tent shown by the signing of such an instrument could not be
more plain; yet the courts persist in avoiding such releases
because some injury was unknown at the time of contract-
ing.
4
9
Moreover, it can be argued that allowing releases to be set aside
will "open the floodgates."5
" Id. at 676.
a See DOBBS ON REMEDIES § 11.10, at 776.
'" 176 S.E.2d at 675.
' Id. at 676, referring to Seaboard Ice Co. v. Lee, 99 S.E.2d 721 (Va. 1957).
" See, e.g., Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co., 366 P.2d 527 (Ore. 1961); Dobbs,
Basic Problems at 705.
" Note, Avoidance of Personal Injury Release for Mutual Mistake of Fact, 7 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 98, 101 (1958). Accord, Note, Contracts-Avoidance of Release on
Grounds of Mistake as to Unknown Injuries, 15 ALA. L. RE V. 238, 241 (1962); cf. Dobbs,
Basic Problems at 666-67 (indicating the advantages of "final" settlements).
" "A general release duly executed and fairly obtained is a complete bar to further
recovery for injuries sustained, otherwise, the floodgates would open. Reinhardt
v. Wilbur, 105 A.2d 415, 416 (N.J. Super. 1954).
19751
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D. Conclusion
As indicated above, there are conflicting policies at work
in personal injury release situations. On the one hand, defen-
dants rightfully desire to purchase "peace"-to be certain that
the controversy has been terminated. On the other hand, plain-
tiffs legitimately expect to be fairly compensated for injuries
they have suffered because of the defendants' torts. In
Trevathan, the Kentucky Court of Appeals seemed to be un-
necessarily hardnosed in its consideration of the plaintiff's
plea. It seemed to be too willing to apply an impersonal com-
mercial analysis to a situation where such an approach is inap-
propriate, 5' for it is clear that the trend in tort law is in favor
of compensation 2 by the tortfeasor, not by society and its agen-
cies (through welfare, for example). Perhaps all this can be
summarized by a quotation from Professor Dobbs' excellent
article:
In tort law contract is not very important because the rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendant, or victim and
wrongdoer, is not based on contract but on "status"-a rela-
tionship recognized and imposed by law, much against the
will of the defendant in most cases. There is no reason, except
one of convenience, to permit that status to be terminated or
altered significantly by contract. The reason of convenience
speaks loudly, because we do generally want disputes settled;
but it need not speak with authoritative finality. 3
Trevathan does not present the most compelling facts in
favor of relief, because the plaintiff was neither stupid nor igno-
rant, and the release was not obtained immediately after the
accident, before her injuries would normally come to light.
Nevertheless, the case deserved a more thorough and humane
treatment than that afforded it by the Court of Appeals. A
sensible approach is the one set forth by Professor Dobbs, who
lists nine "Factors in Recovery" to be considered by the
courts:54 (1) Amount of settlement; (2) proportion of settlement
to actual injury; (3) counsel [i.e., was plaintiff represented?];
See DOBBS ON REMEDIES at 777-78.
52 Cf. DOBBS ON REMEDIES at 778.
"Dobbs, Basic Problems at 726.
5' Id. at 713-21.
[Vol. 64
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(4) claimant's intelligence; (5) whether liability was in issue;
(6) time of settlement; (7) time of bringing suit; (8) form of
settlement; (9) language of the release. Of course another rea-
sonable approach to the problem would be for the General
Assembly to legislate on the matter, as has been done else-
where, either by creating a "cooling off" period's or by more
broadly allowing relief from mistake."
II. THE EFFECT OF RELEASING ONE OF A NUMBER OF "JOINT"
TORT-FEASORS
A. Introduction
In Sanderson v. Hughes,5" the plaintiffs, victims of an au-
tQmobile accident, executed a release which expressly dis-
charged two tort-feasors from "all claims, demands, actions
and causes of action growing out of bodily injuries and property
damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident.""' Although
the release included a statement that it was "in full and com-
plete settlement of a liability claimed," 9 it included neither an
express reservation of rights against unnamed parties nor "the
broad language found in many such instruments which ex-
pressly releases the named tort-feasors, together with any and
all other persons, from liability."6 When the plaintiffs later
filed suit against a third tort-feasor for injuries resulting from
the accident referred to in the release, the defendant success-
fully moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 11 (1975):
In any and all cases in which any person sustains personal injuries as a result
of a tort . . . any release of the claim . . . for damages resulting from such
tort, signed by such injured person within 5 days of the infliction of such
injuries . . . shall be voidable within 60 days at the option of such injured
party.
Accord, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-08-08, 9-08-09 (1975).
'" See TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3002 (Supp. 1974): "Where a compromise settlement
of a claim for damages resulting from personal injuries has been brought about by...
mistake, such settlements may be rescinded ..
7 526 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1975).
Id., quoting the Court's paraphrasing of the terms of the release. The actual
language of the release is not contained in the opinion.
The two parties expressly named in the release apparently were another driver
involved in the collision and the owner of the vehicle he was driving.
Id. (emphasis by the Court).
Id. (emphasis by the Court).
1975]
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release of one "joint" or "concurrent"'" tort-feasor automati-
cally releases all such tort-feasors. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
In the Court's opinion, written by Commissioner Vance,
all but one of the Justices 2 expressed their continued faith in
the rule applied in the 1961 case of Kingins v. Hurt:3 "[A]
release of one joint or concurring tort-feasor serves to release
them all unless on its face it can be fairly interpreted as reserv-
ing the claimant's rights against other tort-feasors." 4 Thus, the
Court viewed the release as fatal to the plaintiffs' cause of
action, even though it did not expressly discharge unnamed
tort-feasors, and notwithstanding its phraseology referring to
"a claim as opposed to all claims. ' 5 This result was reached
by refusing to recognize the various implications of the phrase
just quoted, thereby allowing the majority to conclude that
"there is nothing contained in the instrument which can rea-
" The term "joint tort-feasor" really should be reserved for situations involving
concerted action or conspiracy between or among more than one tort-feasor, whereas
the term "concurrent tort-feasor" is aptly applied to situations involving two or more
tort-feasors whose wholly independent acts concurrently caused an indivisible injury.
Because true concurrent tort-feasors are often "joined" as defendants in modem law-
suits, the term "joint tort-feasors" has been used generally by courts, albeit somewhat
incorrectly, in reference to both types of tort-feasors. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS §§ 46-47 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Years earlier, Prosser
had commented:
"Joint tort-feasor" is one of those unhappy phrases of indeterminate mean-
ing, whose repetition has done so much to befog the law. Nobody knows what
exactly is a joint tort. . . . An examination of the multitude of cases leads
to the conclusion that "joint tort-feasor" means radically different things to
different courts, and often to the same court, that much of the existing
confusion is due to the entire failure to distinguish the different senses in
which the term is used; and that separate problems of joinder of parties in
the same action, as a matter of procedure, and the substantive liability of
two or more defendants for the same result, require separate consideration
and have very little in common.
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937). Prosser
concluded:
When . . . concurrent wrongdoers who have caused the same loss become
"joint tort-feasors," the result is chaos . . . . It is deplorable that common
law notions of unity of a cause of action have survived to such an extent.
Id. at 423-24.
" Chief Justice Reed filed a dissenting opinion, which is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
63 344 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1961).
1, 526 S.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 309 (emphasis by the Court).
[Vol. 64
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sonably be interpreted to preserve a right of action against
other tort-feasors.
'
)
6
Chief Justice Reed filed a lone dissent, saying that he
would "prospectively67 change the [Kingins] rule" because its
results were "questionable" and because post-Kingins cases
"have thrown the result more out of harmony in that area of
tort law."68 The Chief Justice's opinion also effectively dispels
some old "bugaboos" and rejects the basic joint tort-feasor-
release rule as "harsh in the light of current realities." 9
B. The Origin of the Joint Tort-Feasor-Release Rule and Its
Many Modifications
Dean Prosser has pointed out that the joint tort-feasor-
release rule originated in the English law notion that only one
judgment could be obtained for a joint tort: "Since the act of
each tortfeasor was the act of all, it was considered that there
was only one cause of action, which was . . . merged in the
judgment, and judgment against one alone, even though unsa-
tisfied, barred any later action against another."70 This, of
course, should never have been viewed as affecting "concur-
rent" as opposed to "joint" tort-feasors, but, unfortunately, it
was so viewed by American courts which confused it with "a
quite distinct [and basically 'equitable'] principle, that the
e Id.
I The suggestion that the rule should be changed "prospectively," i.e., for pur-
poses of future cases only, is somewhat inconsistent with calling the opinion a "dissent-
ing opinion." Moreover, these would be odd circumstances in which to apply a "pro-
spective" approach, as was pointed out by the Court about 10 years ago:
We are not persuaded that claimants have been lulled into execution of full
releases by virtue of reliance upon decisions of this court that the releases
did not mean what they said. On the contrary, it seems plain that no person
cognizant of the law would deliberately execute a full release with a view to
later asserting that the release did not mean what it said.
Dep't of Highways v. Cardwell, 409 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Ky. 1966).
526 S.W.2d at 309.
Id. Chief Justice Reed also relied upon Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky.
1970), "as explicated in" Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974). Reliance upon
Orr seems odd because in its only arguably relevant part it merely held that: "Knowl-
edge by the jury that one of the claimed tort-feasors has paid off certainly could serve
no legitimate purpose." Orr v. Coleman, supra at 61. Likewise, the Cox case, while
containing a clarification of one point in Orr, does not state anything relevant to the
joint tort-feasor-release issue. See Cox v. Cooper, supra at 536 n.3.
PRossER § 48, at 299.
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plaintiff was entitled to but one compensation for his loss, and
that satisfaction of his claim, even by a stranger to the action,
would prevent its further enforcement."7 Today, the "one
cause of action" rule has fallen into disrepute, whereas the
"one satisfaction" rule is still in good standing.72 Nevertheless,
application of the "one cause of action" rule to releases of one
concurrent tort-feasor, albeit an incorrect application ab initio,
has continued, causing confusion and inequity. 73
Legal scholars have been united in their condemnation of
the joint tort-feasor-release rule. For example, consider Dean
Prosser's view:
[The rule] has been justly condemned because it compels
the plaintiff either to forego any opportunity of obtaining
what he can get from one defendant without suit, or to give
up his entire claim against the other without full compensa-
tion. Historically, and logically, it has no justification ....
The fear of double recovery is meaningless, since the amount
paid under the release must be credited to the second tort-
feasor in any case; and the argument that the plaintiff should
not be permitted to make piece-meal collections from differ-
ent defendants is quite pointless when he is allowed to do
precisely that after judgment.
74
Wigmore, while still a student, made no bones about his dis-
dain for the rule and his hope for its early demise:
Our obnoxious old friend, that constant companion of per-
sonal injury cases, viz., the rule that a release to one of several
joint tort-feasors is a discharge of all, is receiving numerous
hard knocks lately. He is already aged and infirm, being quite
anachronistic; and it looks as though he would soon have to
retire from active meddling in the affairs of men ....
. . . We shall not be sorry to end acquaintance with this old
party, for he is merely a surviving relic of the Cokian period
of metaphysics. He arrived at maturity, after a period of in-
fantile uncertainty, in Coke's time . . . . Crossing to this
7I Id.
72 Id. at 299-301.
73 Id. at 301-02.
7' Id. at 302. The second part of this quotation was directly relied upon by Chief
Justice Reed in his dissenting opinion in Sanderson, 526 S.W.2d at 309. Cf. 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 711-12 (1956).
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country at a fairly early date, his right to settlement was
vigorously disputed; but he finally established himself pretty
generally in the good graces of our supreme courts. 5
Although many courts have recognized the unreasona-
bleness of the rule, most have chosen the less severe step of
modifying rather than repudiating it. As a result, numerous
methods of finessing the rule have been developed, most nota-
bly: the express reservation of rights, the covenant not to sue
and the repayable loan evidenced by a "loan receipt." Thus, it
has often been held that if the release itself contains an express
reservation of rights against unnamed parties, the normal, au-
tomatic release of such parties is avoided.7 8 Indeed, some juris-
dictions have even allowed the "reservation" to be shown by
extrinsic evidence,7 on the theory that the parol evidence rule
is not applicable in favor of one not a party to the release. 8
Covenants not to sue, that is, promises that the tort victim
would not bring an action against the promisee-tort-feasor,
have been viewed as simply not coming within the joint tort-
feasor-release rule because they are not in the form of releases, 9
notwithstanding that they function in exactly the same way as
releases." Repayable loans evidenced by so-called "loan re-
ceipts" likewise are not held to be releases for purposes of the
joint tort-feasor-release rule,"1 again despite the fact they func-
,1 17 ILL. L. REV. 563 (1923).
,8 See, e.g., Kingins v. Hurt, 344 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1961); Middleton v. Rheem Mfg.
Co., 34 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 1948); Black v. Martin, 292 P. 577 (Mont. 1930).
" See, e.g., Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm'r, 79 S.W. 261, 262
(Ky. 1904); Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co., 131 N.W. 612 (Neb. 1911).
'1 See, e.g., Davis v. Moses, 215 N.W. 225 (Minn. 1927); Fitzgerald v. Union Stock
Yards Co., 131 N.W. 612, 615 (Neb. 1911).
" See, e.g., McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Breen v. Peck, 146
A.2d 665, 674 (N.J. 1958) (concurring opinion).
" Dean Prosser refers to this as a "technical evasion, which is the most obvious
of subterfuges for circumventing an inconvenient common law rule." PROSSER § 49, at
303. Cf. McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Pedersen v. Bring,
117 N.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Iowa 1962); Gronquist v. Olson, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Minn.
1954).
" See Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop, 500 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Ky. 1973), where the
"loan receipt" read as follows:
Received from the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, for and on behalf
Charles S. Davis, Dorothy B. Davis, Jeffrey Davis and Danny D. Davis, the
sum of $20,000.00, as a loan, and in full consideration for all claims which
the undersigned may have against Charles S. Davis, Dorothy B. Davis, Jef-
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tion as releases. 2
In addition to the various judicial techniques for circum-
venting the joint tort-feasor-release rule, several states have
ameliorated the problem legislatively. 3 Even more impor-
tantly, modern courts are showing a decided tendency to reject
the older rule outright in favor of a more rational approach that
asks whether the releasing tort victim really was compensated
for his loss and intended to surrender his right to sue unnamed
joint tort-feasors:
Two factors should be controlling in determining the effect of
an agreement purporting to operate as a release:
(1) Whether the injured party has received full satisfaction;
and
(2) Whether the parties intended that the release be in full
satisfaction of the injured party's claim, thus releasing all
. . . [other] tort-feasors from liability. . . . (Both are ques-
frey Davis and Danny Davis. . . . This loan, without interest, is repayable
only in the event and to the extent of any net recovery the undersigned may
make from any person, persons, corporation, corporations or other parties
causing or liable for the accident aforesaid and as security for such repay-
ment the undersigned hereby pledges to The Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company all her claim or claims against said person, persons, corporations,
or other parties to the extent necessary to repay such loan.
3 See id. at 599:
It seems quite obvious to us that this is not a situation where the com-
pany is making a so-called loan to an insured to pay damages for which the
company might ultimately become liable, but rather is a direct payment
from the insurer to the injured party. There is no possible way to consider
this instrument as representing a loan but rather the intention of the parties
clearly indicates that it is a release acknowledging the payment of a consider-
ation for which the Davises were released from all liability. We, therefore,
hold that the loan receipt constitutes nothing other than a release and it was
valid for such purpose.
" PROSSER § 49, at 303. One of these statutes provides as follows:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given
to one of two or more persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the
same injury, or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the
other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its
terms expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of the releasor against
the other tort-feasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release
or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it. . . which-
ever is the greatest.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975); accord, UNIFORM CONTRIBU-
TION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4(a) (1955), which has been adopted in 16 states
according to 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1975).
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tions of fact and normally to be determined by the jury.) The
actual form or title of the release is immaterial and parol
evidence should be permitted to determine the intent of the
parties."
C. The State of the Law in Kentucky
The pre-1966 Kentucky law relating to the joint tort-
feasor-release rule is nicely summarized in Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion in Department of Highways v. Cardwell.,5
Justice Stewart traced the issue to a 1904 case which held:
"The law ought not to be that a release of one tort-feasor, by
his making a partial satisfaction for the wrong done, should
operate as a release of the other wrongdoers." 6 He pointed out
that this early case had produced the following effects:
(1) The establishment of the rule that the release of one joint
tort-feasor is not automatically the release of all; and
(2) the admissibility of parol evidence to show (a) the inten-
tion of the parties and (b) the amount of satisfaction of the
claim.87
Some years later, another case reaffirmed these principles de-
spite release language unequivocally stating that the settle-
ment amount was accepted "in full for damage received." 8
Justice Stewart continued by noting a later case in which
a reservation of rights provision was held to preclude the nor-
mal application of the joint tort-feasor-release rule.89 This ap-
proach was reaffirmed in 1945, ° 194991 and again in 1959.92
" Wecker v. Kilmer, 294 N.E.2d 132, 135 (Ind. 1973); accord, Young v. State, 455
P.2d 889, 893 (Alas. 1969); Community School Dist. v. Gordon N. Peterson, Inc., 176
N.W.2d 169, 175 (Iowa 1970).
409 S.W.2d 304, 306-10 (Ky. 1966).
' Id. at 307, quoting Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm'r, 79 S.W.
261, 263 (Ky. 1904).
409 S.W.2d at 307.
Id., quoting Lawrence v. Board of Councilmen, 172 S.W. 953 (Ky. 1915) (em-
phasis added).
1 409 S.W.2d at 308, referring to Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Beaucord, 224 S.W.
179 (Ky. 1920), about which Justice Stewart noted: "[A]lthough the release is not
quoted in the opinion, it expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to prosecute an action
against the defendant electric company."
11 See Miller's Adm'x v. Picard, 191 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ky. 1945).
See Deatley v. Phillips, 225 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1949).
2 See Daniel v. Turner, 320 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1959).
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Thus, Justice Stewart correctly summarized the pre-1961 Ken-
tucky law as follows:
[T]he release of one joint tort-feasor does not automatically
release the others, and . . . evidence extraneous to the
release is admissible to show a contrary intention in avoid-
ance of the release. In so holding this court had abandoned
the common law view so frequently criticized, and had gone
farther than most jurisdictions in carrying out the intention
of the parties. 3
However, in 1961 the Court decided Kingins v. Hurt,"4 in
which a deceased wife's estate settled with a tortious railroad
company, but later sued the deceased husband's estate. The
release executed by the wife's estate's representative referred
to "all claims, demands, or causes of action of every character
whatsoever," but did not expressly refer to unnamed tort-
feasors.5 Nevertheless, the Court unanimously held that be-
cause the written release made no reference to reserved rights
against unnamed parties, no such rights survived its execution:
We are of the opinion . . . that so long as we are committed
to the basic rule itself, that the release of one releases all, the
written instrument should be construed to mean what it says,
and unless on its face it can fairly be interpreted as reserving
the claimant's rights against other tort-feasors it will be
treated as an unconditional release. 8
Interestingly, this opinion, which relies upon "commitment" to
doctrine, expressly recognized the inconsistency between its
own principles and some of the cases discussed earlier." The
Court also recognized that Dean Prosser disagreed with its
new-born position.18 It did, however, find some solace in the
Restatement of Torts.19
11 409 S.W.2d at 309.
344 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1961).
Id. at 811-12.
, Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
'7 Id., referring to cases cited in notes 89 and 92 supra.
' Id., referring to W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 46, at 269 (3d ed. 1964).
Id., citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885(1) (1939) (emphasis added):
A valid release of one tort-feasor from liability for a harm, given by the
injured person, discharges all others liable for the same harm, unless the
parties to the release agree that the release shall not discharge the others
[Vol. 64
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The next decision after Kingins was the Cardwell case in
1966.00 There, the majority adhered to the Kingins approach,
thus excluding extrinsic evidence tending to prove that a re-
lease, which by its terms included "all other persons" in addi-
tion to those named, was not really intended to discharge un-
named tort-feasors. The gist of the Court's reasoning was that
it was "committed" to Kingins' teaching that "the plain lan-
guage of the release must control." 101 Justice Stewart's dissent
accurately pinpointed the shortcomings of the majority's opin-
ion and concluded that Kingins should have been overruled.102
Only one more case need be mentioned before
concluding-Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop, 03 a 1973 decision.
There, a "loan receipt" was employed and the Court held that
although it did not express on its face any reservation of right,
its language providing for the possibility that further suits
might be brought against other parties implied that such rights
were reserved.'0 4 Of course, this was merely a logical and sensi-
ble extension of the Kingins rule.0 5
and, if the release is embodied in a document, unless such agreement
appears in the document.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885(1) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1971) (emphasis
added):
A valid release of one tort-feasor from liability for a harm, given by the
injured person, does not discharge others liable for the same harm, unless it
is agreed that it shall do so.
Cf. id. at Comment d:
It is not essential that the reservation of rights against other tort-feasors
be expressed in the document itself. Such a requirement 'night easily prove
a booby-trap for the unwary, since releases are commonly signed by individu-
als without legal advice. The agreement as to the effect of the release may
be proved by external evidence; and the objection of the parol evidence rule
is met by the fact that the second tort-feasor who raises the question is not
a party to the instrument.
,1" Dep't of Highways v. Cardwell, 409 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1966).
101 Id. at 306.
102 Id. at 306-10.
1.3 500 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1973).
"0I Id. at 599.
'5 The Sanderson Court correctly countered the plaintiff's claim that Biven had
announced a modification of the Kingins rule by noting that Biven involved a "loan
receipt" rather than a "release" and that certain language in Biven was mere surplu-
sage.
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
D. Conclusion
There are currently four approaches to the joint tort-
feasor-release issue. The first is the strict common law rule
whereby a release of one tort-feasor releases all tort-feasors,
even if the release itself contains an express reservation clause.
The second approach, the "reservation of rights" concept, is a
modified version of the common law rule. According to this
approach, a release of one tort-feasor releases all others, unless
the release itself expressly or impliedly reserves the rights
against all other joint tort-feasors. Kentucky has adopted this
rule. The third view is that of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,'6 under which a release of one tort-feasor does not re-
lease all other joint tort-feasors unless the release expressly so
provides. The last view, which might most accurately be re-
ferred to as the "real intent" approach, holds that even a re-
lease which contains a clause expressly discharging "all other
persons" may be interpreted, either directly or by recourse to
parol evidence, as discharging only the named parties. In the
opinion of this writer, these four views have been listed in as-
cending order of their preferability.
,I" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885(1) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1971),
quoted in note 99 supra.
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